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ABSTRACT 
 
Nozick is often interpreted as arguing that independents are entitled to protection by the 
Dominant Protective Agency (DPA) because the DPA infringes their right to punish those who 
violate their rights. Yet a closer look at Anarchy, State and Utopia reveals that Nozick actually 
rejects the very argument which is commonly attributed to him, and that he does so for good 
reason. However, I argue that Nozick’s replacement principle of compensation for disadvantage, 
meant to ground his real argument for independents’ entitlement to protection by the DPA, ought 
to be unacceptable to a libertarian. I end by suggesting an alternative to it, which I think remains 
faithful to basic libertarian principles. 
 
THE MINIMAL STATE 
 
To qualify as a state, Nozick claims, an association must as a minimum condition have ‘the 
requisite sort of monopoly over the use of force in the territory’ and it must protect ‘the rights of 
everyone in the territory, even if this universal protection could be provided only in a 
“redistributive” fashion’.1 In part one of Anarchy, State and Utopia, Nozick sets himself the 
formidable task of demonstrating that such a state could arise, with no morally impermissible 
steps, from a Hobbesian style ‘state of nature’. What makes his task difficult is that for Nozick, 
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morally permissibility is to be judged according to libertarian standards, with their emphasis on 
the protection of property rights and freedom from interference. 
The story begins with the emergence of a ‘dominant protective agency’ (DPA), a private 
enforcement agency which hires out its protection and which, over time, has achieved dominance 
over competing agencies in a certain geographical area. The DPA does not yet, however, satisfy 
the condition for statehood, since the existence of several ‘independents’ who choose to exercise 
‘self-help’ enforcement of their rights rather than hire the DPA’s services, means that the DPA 
does not yet enjoy a monopoly on the use of force in its territory. Nozick faces two problems in 
showing how the DPA could acquire, without any morally impermissible steps, the role of 
universal force provider, which would allow it to be considered a minimal state. First, he must 
show how libertarian morality can permit the DPA to exercise a monopoly on force by 
preventing agents from exercising self-help enforcement of their rights. Such prevention would, 
prima facie, seem to constitute a morally impermissible instance of interference for a libertarian. 
Second, he must explain why the DPA is obliged to protect the rights of everyone in the territory, 
even if that requires redistributive taxation to pay for the protection of those who do not 
voluntarily hire the DPA’s protective services. Once again, such redistributive taxation seems, at 
first sight, distinctly unlibertarian.  
Nozick’s argument for the minimal state constitutes one of the most difficult and tangled 
sections of Anarchy, State, and Utopia, such that it has been left to his commentators to try to 
elucidate the argument which Nozick thinks justifies the move from the DPA to the minimal 
state. In this paper I argue that several commentators have hitherto misunderstood the central 
point of Nozick’s argument. There has been a tendency to interpret Nozick as defending, in 
whole or in part, an argument which I will call the ‘argument from encroachment’. However, 
Nozick actually rejects this argument, and his reasons for doing so are entirely convincing. 
 3 
THE COMPENSATION FOR ENCROACHMENT PARADIGM 
One way in which one may take on a positive obligation to do something in the context of a 
Nozickean moral framework is by becoming obliged to provide reparations for having infringed 
the rights of another party. I will follow Thomson and Feinberg in making use of a distinction 
between infringing rights and violating rights.2 If one agent has a right that X not be brought 
about, then another agent infringes that right if she brings X about. A violation of a right occurs 
when an agent infringes a right and when that infringement may be regarded as all things 
considered morally culpable. I will also make use of the phrase encroaching upon a right to refer 
to infringements which are not violations. An encroachment upon a right thus takes place when 
an agent infringes a right in a manner which is not all things considered morally culpable.3 
Both violations of rights and encroachments of rights may (but need not) require the 
infringing agent to provide compensation to the agent whose rights are infringed. But since 
violations are all things considered morally impermissible, their intentional performance by the 
DPA cannot be condoned regardless of whether compensation is paid after the event. That is, 
Nozick cannot move from the DPA to the minimal state without any morally impermissible steps 
if he condones rights violations. Encroachments, on the other hand, occur when a right is 
infringed, but when the infringement is not all things considered morally culpable. As such, 
intentional encroachments can potentially feature in the move from the DPA to the minimal 
state, grounding a duty on the part of the DPA to compensate independents for having 
encroached upon their rights. When compensation is owed as a result of a rights encroachment, 
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let us say that the compensation for encroachment paradigm applies. In order for an 
infringement of a right to be considered an encroachment rather than a violation, there must be 
some moral sanction for the infringement which prevents the infringement from being all things 
considered morally culpable (which, in the absence of the sanction, it would be).4 Note, however, 
that although the presence of a moral sanction is a necessary condition for the applicability of the 
compensation for encroachment paradigm, it may not be a sufficient condition. For it is possible 
that some sanctions may not leave an obligation to compensate in their wake. Suppose, for 
example, that whilst rock climbing Emma and Harry get into trouble and Emma finds that the 
only way she can save Harry’s life is by cutting his rope (that is, a rope that he owns, not just the 
rope that he is attached to). It seems to me that Emma is not obliged to buy Harry a new rope in 
compensation. 
In order to defend the claim that the compensation for encroachment paradigm may be 
applied to the case of the DPA and the independent, one would have to show three things. First, 
that independents possess some right which the DPA has a motivation to infringe. Second, that 
some sanction exists which allows the infringement of the right to be treated as an encroachment 
rather than a prohibited violation. And third, that the sanction leaves an obligation to compensate 
in its wake. 
NOZICK AND THE ARGUMENT FROM ENCROACHMENT 
An argument of just this type is sometimes (mis)attributed to Robert Nozick. I will call it the 
argument from encroachment. According to this interpretation of Nozick, he argues that 
independents (along with everyone else) have a right to punish those who violate their rights. 
The DPA encroaches upon this right by enforcing a prohibition on self-help procedures for 
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determining guilt and subsequent punishment.5 It enforces this prohibition in order to protect its 
clients against the potentially grave risk that such procedures will result in the punishment of an 
innocent client, or the punishment of a guilty client disproportionately to his crime. The DPA, 
however, is obliged to compensate independents for this encroachment. The cheapest way that it 
can do this is by protecting independents itself, as a replacement for the self-help protection that 
it prohibits (though only in conflicts with other clients, since the DPA need not interfere at all in 
disputes between independents and other independents). 
Perhaps the clearest statement of this interpretation of Nozick is to be found in Jonathan 
Wolff’s book on Nozick, where at one point he even says that this is the ‘corner stone of 
Nozick’s argument for the minimal state’.6 J. Wolff writes: 
John Wayne [the independent] has a natural right to punish others, but the dominant agency 
refuses to allow him to exercise that right because of the risk of harm he will do misusing that 
right. But, Nozick argues, if it prohibits him from using his natural right the dominant agency 
must compensate him for this.7 
On this interpretation, Nozick’s postulation of a procedural right ‘to be shown that [one] is being 
handled by some reliable and fair system’ is supposed to provide the sanction for the DPA’s 
infringement, thus making it an encroachment rather than a violation.8 That is to say, clients 
accused of a crime have a procedural right to be tried by a system of justice which is ‘fair and 
reliable’, and they may thus authorise the DPA to enforce this right on their behalf by prohibiting 
the use of unreliable self-help methods.9 Alternatively, since Nozick recognises that the 
assumption of procedural rights may be problematic, he suggests (on this interpretation) as an 
alternative route to roughly the same conclusion the ‘epistemic border crossing principle’ 
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(EBCP).10 This principle states that ‘If someone knows that doing act A would violate Q’s rights 
unless condition C obtained, he may not do A if he has not ascertained that C obtains through 
being in the best feasible position for ascertaining this’.11 The thought would be that since self-
help methods of enforcement cannot live up to this principle (only the DPA can be in ‘the best 
feasible position’ for ascertaining that C obtains), the DPA is sanctioned in preventing the 
independent from using such methods in the exercise of his right to punish. 
THE WRONG SANCTION? 
Despite several attributions (both partial and complete) of the above argument to Nozick, he 
actually explicitly rejects it. But before discussing this rejection, I first wish to note the dilemma 
that one encounters if one tries to defend the argument from encroachment in its above form. The 
problem arises when one reflects on the sort of obligations of compensation that the sanctions of 
either procedural rights or the EBCP leave in their wake. They don’t seem to leave any. For 
procedural rights and the EBCP are more than just sanctions for encroachments, they are fully 
fledged moral principles which play the same sort of moral role as the right to punish. That is, 
they delimit the bounds of what one may or may not do in general. They do not (as in the case of 
sanctions which are not what I have called ‘fully fledged moral principles’) simply point to an 
extenuating circumstance which offers a reprieve from some otherwise binding moral 
requirement. 
Thus, if one takes procedural rights or the EBCP as the sanction for the DPA’s 
prohibition, one finds oneself confronted, like J. Wolff and others, with an apparent ‘clash of 
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rights’.12 But if there is a clash of rights, it seems difficult, perhaps impossible for a libertarian, 
to explain why the procedural rights of clients, or the EBCP, should take precedence over the 
independents’ right to punish. Libertarianism, with its emphasis on negative rights, manages in 
general to avoid clashes of rights and so does not rank rights in order of priority. In the event of a 
clash of rights, the libertarian seems to be at a loss to explain why either should take precedence 
over the other. Alternatively, as J. Wolff continues, one might say that procedural rights or the 
EBCP constrain the rights of independents (and everyone else), such that independents do not 
even have a right to punish unless they can do so without violating procedural rights or the 
EBCP. But if that is the case, no compensation at all seems to be required according to the 
compensation for encroachment paradigm, since no right is infringed. 
One way that the argument from encroachment could try to avoid this dilemma is by 
arguing that the sanction is not procedural rights or the EBCP, but rather, the very risk itself of 
violence being committed against innocent parties due to unreliable methods of prosecution. For 
this sanction does seem to leave an obligation to compensate in its wake. Lomasky argues 
convincingly that one can sometimes be sanctioned in encroaching upon a right simply by virtue 
of one’s ‘extreme need’.13 One might think that the mere risk of severe punishment being applied 
to an innocent (or only mildly punishment deserving) client by an independent using self-help 
enforcement methods could be seen as creating an appropriately ‘extreme need’ of protection on 
the part of clients. If so, this alone could sanction the DPA’s prohibiting self-help enforcement 
and thus encroaching upon independents’ rights to punish. 
 This modified form of the argument from encroachment might seem like the best 
argument a libertarian could give to defend the conclusion that independents are entitled to 
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protection by the DPA. But in fact Nozick explicitly rejects this argument. He does not reject the 
compensation for encroachment paradigm itself; rather, he rejects the claim that it is applicable 
in the case of the DPA and the independent. 
NOZICK’S REJECTION OF THE ARGUMENT FROM ENCROACHMENT 
There are two principles which are central to Nozickean libertarianism. The first is that, in the 
absence of some appropriate sanction, an agent does not have the right to intentionally violate the 
rights of others (even if he pays compensation afterwards). Other agents may coercively prohibit 
him, without providing compensation, from performing an action which will certainly constitute 
such a violation. Let us call prohibitions authorised under this principle, compensation free 
prohibitions. The second principle is that no agent has the right to prohibit other agents from 
performing actions which will certainly not violate any rights (nor a handful of additional non-
rights-based principles, such as the EBCP and the Lockean proviso). Such prohibitions would 
themselves constitute infringements of rights. As we saw above, agents can sometimes be 
permitted to infringe others’ rights, provided that some moral sanction exists for the 
infringement. But when a right is infringed, even when such infringement is morally permitted, 
compensation is payable. As such, an agent who prohibits another from performing a non-rights-
violating action must compensate the agent whom he prohibits. Let us call such prohibitions, 
compensation requiring prohibitions. 
 The dilemma that Nozick encounters is that in the case of merely risky actions, one 
cannot know whether or not a particular action will end up violating any rights until after it has 
been performed. But if one pre-emptively prohibits such actions, then one will never get the 
chance to find out. In some cases, including the case of risky self-help enforcement procedures, 
one may never find out: an independent may convict and punish someone using his self-help 
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procedures, yet the accused may go on protesting his innocence until death. So in the case of 
prohibitions on risky actions, it is impossible to know whether the prohibition ought to be 
regarded as compensation free or compensation requiring. Risky actions pose, as Nozick notes, 
‘serious problems for a natural-rights position’.14 
The argument from encroachment described above oversimplifies the issue by ignoring 
this epistemological problem. It assumes that a prohibition on self-help enforcement is 
compensation demanding, because it encroaches upon the rights of independents to punish. But it 
only encroaches upon this right when it prevents an independent from punishing a guilty person. 
It does not encroach upon the right when it prevents an independent from punishing an innocent 
person. The problem is that it is impossible to know which of these alternatives obtains, and thus 
whether any particular instance of the prohibition’s enforcement is compensation demanding or 
compensation free.15 So one cannot just conclude that compensation is owed in the manner 
normally required by the compensation for encroachment paradigm, and that is the underlying 
reason why, in contrast to the aforementioned interpretations, Nozick does not endorse but 
rightly rejects the argument from encroachment. 
NOZICK’S SOLUTION: COMPENSATION FOR DISADVANTAGE 
Nozick’s own solution to the risky actions dilemma is to invent a whole new paradigm 
specifically to cover the problematic cases. I will call it the compensation for disadvantage 
paradigm. The compensation for disadvantage paradigm applies when, and only when, one agent 
enforces a morally sanctioned prohibition on another agent’s risky activities. Nozick suggests 
that in such cases, we might apply what he calls (somewhat confusingly, since the name doesn’t 
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much help us to distinguish these cases from compensation for encroachment cases) the 
‘principle of compensation’, stated thus: 
Those who are disadvantaged by being forbidden to do actions that only might harm others must be 
compensated for these disadvantages foisted upon them in order to provide security for the others.16 
Disadvantage is to be understood here as being disadvantaged ‘compared to the normal 
situation’, not as ‘being made worse off than one otherwise would be’. That is to say, one is 
disadvantaged when one is prevented from performing ‘important activities done by almost all’, 
but not when one is prevented from performing one’s ‘most profitable alternative’.17 If an agent 
suffers no disadvantage through the prohibition, then he is entitled to no compensation. If an 
agent does suffer a disadvantage through the prohibition, he must be compensated for the 
disadvantage minus some amount representing the cost he would have expended in performing 
the prohibited action, were it not prohibited.18 Nozick explicitly states on more than one occasion 
that the compensation for disadvantage paradigm is not to be assimilated to the compensation for 
encroachment paradigm. For example, he writes that: 
In order to view the compensation under the principle of compensation as ordinary compensation 
for a border crossing, one might try to redefine or relocate the border so that it is crossed only 
when someone is disadvantaged. But it is more perspicuous not to distort our view of this 
compensation situation by assimilating it to another one. 
 [… This compensation situation] is not to be assimilated to the border-crossing sort of 
compensation situation.19 
In the case of the DPA and the independent, the compensation for encroachment paradigm does 
not apply. Rather, the compensation for disadvantage paradigm applies. (Almost without 
exception, interpretations of Nozick tend to move without explanation from the claim that the 
DPA encroaches the rights of independents in enforcing a prohibition on self-help procedures 
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(which Nozick rejects), to the claim that the DPA must compensate independents for 
disadvantages imposed on them (which Nozick does say), without ever recognising the 
significance of the crucial distinction between the two paradigms).20 Unreliable self-help 
enforcement methods are risky, since they risk violating the rights of innocent parties who are 
wrongly convicted. Thus the DPA ‘may treat the unreliable enforcer of justice as it treats any 
performer of a risky action’.21 It may prohibit self-help enforcement, provided that it 
compensates for any disadvantages caused by the prohibition. Such compensation can be 
provided by offering the DPA’s own protection to independents. 
 Since the principle of compensation for disadvantage requires only that independents be 
compensated for disadvantages they suffer relative to the norm, not all independents will be 
entitled to free compensation by the DPA.22 Wealthy independents must pay the full price for the 
DPA’s protection, since they are not made any worse off relative to the norm by having to make 
such payments: they can pay the full price and still be at least as wealthy as the average person. 
The financially hard pressed, on the other hand, will indeed require free protection from the DPA 
to avoid being rendered worse off by the prohibition. Most agents, however, will lie somewhere 
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between the two extremes and require a partially subsidised protection policy from the state, the 
size of the subsidy depending on their financial position.23 
AGAINST COMPENSATION FOR DISADVANTAGE 
Why should we accept the compensation for disadvantage paradigm as a resolution of the 
dilemma posed by risky actions? Why is it appropriate to compensate agents prohibited from 
performing such actions only for disadvantages they suffer relative to the norm, rather than to 
provide some greater or lesser amount of compensation? In particular, how can a libertarian 
moral framework assign any normative importance to one’s situation relative to the norm? Once 
the dilemma which gives rise to the compensation for disadvantage solution is laid bare, the 
inadequacy of Nozick’s response to the dilemma also becomes apparent. 
It is easy to see why Nozick wants to claim that only disadvantages relative to the norm 
should be compensated for. He explicitly states that he wants to avoid the counterintuitive 
conclusion that you owe compensation for prohibiting the performance of certain sorts of risky 
activities like someone’s playing Russian roulette on yourself, or using an especially dangerous 
manufacturing process in a nearby factory.24 No disadvantage relative to the norm is suffered by 
one who is prevented from indulging in such games of Russian roulette, or using the special 
manufacturing process. On the other hand, a disadvantage relative to how one would have been 
without the prohibition is suffered by such agents. By deliberately specifying that the 
compensation for disadvantage paradigm requires only compensation for disadvantages relative 
to the norm, Nozick seeks to sidestep the conclusion that the Russian roulette player and the 
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dangerous manufacturer are owed compensation. But it might be the case that compensation for 
the Russian roulette player just is one (of several) counterintuitive outcomes of a libertarian 
moral framework, and a bitter pill that a libertarian simply has to swallow if he is committed to 
the basic principles of such a position.25 Indeed, the introduction of a normative role for one’s 
situation relative to the norm seems entirely arbitrary and unacceptable for a libertarian. 
Libertarianism specifically excludes ahistorical principles of distribution from its moral 
framework.26 Yet, without offering a justification, Nozick here suddenly grants a role to 
ahistorical distributional considerations in the principle of compensation for disadvantage. The 
most appropriate response to the dilemma posed by risky actions for one who wished to remain 
faithful to the basic principles of libertarianism seems to me not to be the principle of 
compensation for disadvantage, but rather, the response suggested below. 
In the case of risky actions one cannot know whether or not a prohibition on such actions 
will be compensation demanding or compensation free. Such knowledge would require that one 
see into the future (or behind the pleas of innocence of the accused), in order to determine 
whether or not the action would end up violating any rights were it to be performed. One can, 
however, usually come up with an educated estimate of the probability that the risky action will 
result in a rights violation, and an estimate of the amount of compensation that would be due if it 
did.27 Thus the most appropriate way to compensate for a prohibition on a risky action would be 
first to work out how much compensation would be payable for prohibiting the risky action if it 
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did not end up causing a violation (that is, by applying the compensation for encroachment 
paradigm to the prohibition); then to subtract from this amount the best estimate of the 
compensation that would be due if the risky activity led to a violation (or several violations), 
discounted by the probability of its doing so.28 
This result does not change Nozick’s conclusion that independents are sometimes entitled 
to subsidised DPA protection policies. It does, however, change greatly the method of 
calculating just how large the subsidy ought to be for each independent. In all but a small 
minority of cases, independents would not, using this new method, be entitled to protection free 
of charge. The size of the subsidy in any particular case will depend solely on the DPA’s best 
estimate of the risk that the independent, were it not for the prohibition, would have wrongly 
punished innocent clients (and the best estimate of the severity of that punishment). Such 
counterfactual calculations may be impossible, but if they are, then I think that that should be 
considered to be an objection to libertarianism, rather than a vindication of Nozick’s principle of 
compensation. However, they may not be impossible. The DPA could, for example, advertise 
that it intends to allow self-help procedures that it deems safe to be used, and ask all 
independents wishing to use a self-help procedure to submit details of their preferred procedure. 
If the DPA deems a particular independent’s procedure unsafe and prohibits that procedure, it 
will be able to use the information contained in his application to estimate the risk associated 
with his preferred procedure and thus calculate how much compensation it owes him.29 
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CONCLUSION 
The present article has sought to clarify and to appraise Nozick’s argument for the minimal state. 
I argued that Nozick does not, as is often claimed, defend the claim that the DPA owes 
compensation to independents because it infringes their right to punish those who violate their 
rights. Rather, Nozick argues that the DPA owes compensation according to his principle of 
compensation for disadvantage, because it prohibits the risky practice of self-help enforcement, 
which in any particular instance may or may not result in a rights violation. Nozick is correct to 
treat self-help enforcement as a type of risky action. However, his principle of compensation for 
disadvantage, which claims that those prohibited from performing risky actions should be 
compensated for disadvantages relative to the norm, is arbitrary and unjustifiable in the context 
of a libertarian moral framework. In contrast, the alternative response to the dilemma of risky 
actions suggested in the previous section of this article remains faithful to underlying libertarian 
principles. 
                                                                                                                                                             
less risky (and thus far less likely to find a guilty person guilty, as well as an innocent person) than the one they’d 
really prefer to use. 
 16 
APPENDIX 
Prohibition and Compensation in Part I of 
Anarchy, State, and Utopia 
 
Will certainly not 
violate any rights 
Risky: may violate 
rights, may not 
violate rights 
Will certainly 
violate rights 
Can prohibit 
without 
compensation 
Prohibition re-
quires prior nego-
tiation of com-
pensation to be 
paid (pp. 64-5, 
86) 
An Intended Act 
Prohibitor would 
not be better off if 
performer had not 
existed 
Prohibitor would 
be better off if 
performer had 
not existed 
Performer has 
genuine nonex-
hortative reason 
for performing 
action 
Prohibition requires 
‘full’ compensation 
putting performer 
back on same indif-
ference curve (pp. 
57, 85) 
Performer does 
not have genuine 
nonexhortative 
reason for per-
forming action 
Can prohibit with 
minimal or no com-
pensation (p. 86) 
At least one of the following 
conditions satisfied: 
1. Performer not in a financial 
position to compensate if act 
results in violation (p. 78) 
2. Performance of risky act pro-
duces uncompensated for fear 
(pp. 65-71) 
3. Performance of risky act vio-
lates the Epistemic Principle of 
Border Crossing (pp. 106-7) 
Risky act does 
not  satisfy any 
of the conditions 
listed left 
Risky act may be 
performed pro-
vided compensa-
tion paid by per-
former for either 
expected or ac-
tual violations 
(pp.75-7) 
May prohibit risky 
act provided com-
pensation paid in 
accordance with the 
principle of compen-
sation for disadvan-
tage (pp. 78-84, 86-
7,110-13)  
Compensation for 
encroachment 
paradigm 
Compensation for 
disadvantage 
paradigm 
 
 
 17 
REFERENCES 
Feinberg, Joel. 1978. Voluntary Euthanasia and the Inalienable Right to Life. Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, 7, 93-102. 
Holmes, Richard. 1981. Nozick on Anarchism. Pp. 57-67 in Jeffrey Paul (ed), Reading Nozick: Essays on 
Anarchy, State and Utopia. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Lacey, A. R. 2001. Robert Nozick. Chesham, Bucks: Acumen Publishing Limited. 
Lomasky, Loren. 1991. Compensation and the Bounds of Rights. Nomos, 33, 13-44 
Miller, David. 2002. The Justification of Political Authority. Pp. 10-33 in David Schmidtz (ed), Robert 
Nozick. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Nozick, Robert. 1974. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Paul, Jeffrey. 1981. The Withering of the State. Pp. 68-76 in Jeffrey Paul (ed), Reading Nozick: Essays on 
Anarchy, State and Utopia. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
Thomson, Judith Jarvis. 1986. Some Ruminations on Rights. Pp. 49-65 in William Parent (ed), Rights, 
Restitution and Risk. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. Orig. publ. 1977 in University 
of Arizona Law Review, 19 
Wolff, Jonathan. 1991. Robert Nozick: Property, Justice and the Minimal State. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Wolff, Robert Paul. 1981. Robert Nozick’s Derivation of the Minimal State, Pp. 77-104 in Jeffrey Paul 
(ed), Reading Nozick: Essays on Anarchy, State and Utopia. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
 
